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I. Introduction 
Imagine you are a juror in a Virginia capital murder trial. 
It has reached the penalty phase of trial, the guilt phase having 
concluded with a conviction of first-degree murder. There was 
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little question about the defendant’s culpability—he had 
confessed to the killing—and a guilty verdict was a relatively 
straightforward finding. But now you and your eleven co-jurors 
must confront a far graver issue than the question of guilt. It is a 
question of life or death: should the defendant spend the rest of 
his life behind bars, or face execution?  
Arguing for a life sentence, the defense describes the 
defendant’s tragic past and reveals the emotional and physical 
abuse that the defendant endured throughout his childhood. The 
defendant’s mentally ill mother constantly berated the defendant 
and his sister, screaming at them things such as “I wish I’d never 
had you” and “you’re not worth a shit.” She brutally beat the 
defendant whenever she felt like it, once so uncontrollably that 
his sister thought their mother was going to kill him. The 
defendant’s father, a serial pedophile, routinely sexually 
assaulted the defendant’s sister and younger cousins. When the 
defendant gained enough courage to defend his sister against one 
of their father’s attacks, his father forced him at gunpoint to strip 
to his underwear and kicked him out of the house for good. He 
was sixteen years old.  
On the streets with no one to turn to, the defendant fell 
hard into drug and alcohol addiction. With addiction came a life 
of crime and impulsive violence—offenses which the defendant 
committed only when he was under the influence of drugs, 
alcohol, or both. During his consequent incarcerations, when he 
had no access to drugs or alcohol, the defendant was a model 
prisoner who posed no danger to those around him. After his 
release from prison, the defendant repeatedly tried to break free 
of his addictions. Each time, however, his unstable environment 
and lack of support system stifled his efforts at sobriety. And so 
this cycle of addiction, crime, and imprisonment continued, 
culminating in the murder for which he is currently on trial.  
The prosecution, arguing for a sentence of death, 
emphasizes the defendant’s violent past, specifically focusing on 
the defendant’s criminal record, history of aggression, and the 
circumstances surrounding the murder. Pointing to this 
backwards-looking evidence, the prosecutor argues that the 
defendant is a very dangerous person. The prosecution stresses 
that unless the defendant is executed, he will undoubtedly 
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commit future acts of violence.  
After both sides have concluded their arguments, the 
judge instructs you and your fellow jurors to determine whether 
the defendant will receive the death penalty. You will base your 
decision in large part upon your assessment of the defendant’s 
likelihood of committing future acts of violence “in society.” When 
you ask the judge whether “society” means prison society or 
society in general, the judge responds that “society” means all of 
society.  
To you, this does not make sense. You know—because the 
judge has told you so—that if the defendant is not put to death, 
he will spend the rest of his life behind bars: in Virginia (as in 
virtually all death penalty states), “life imprisonment” means life 
without possibility of parole. If prison is the only place that the 
defendant will ever live, how—and why—would you predict the 
defendant’s future acts in free society? Notwithstanding your 
confusion, you and your fellow jurors realize that you must make 
a decision. You were instructed to determine whether there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit future violent acts 
in all of society, counter-factual as it may be. Although the 
defendant’s painful childhood made you feel sympathetic—and 
was certainly pushing you towards a verdict of life in prison—the 
defendant’s history of violence speaks for itself. Based on the 
judge’s instruction, the decision seems clear. You and the rest of 
the jury return a unanimous sentence of death. 
The foregoing hypothetical describes the very real murder 
trial of Mark Lawlor.1 Lawlor was prosecuted in Fairfax County, 
Virginia, for the murder of Genevieve Orange, a tenant in the 
apartment complex where Lawlor worked.2 Despite the extreme 
brutality of Lawlor’s crime, his defense presented a compelling 
argument against the death penalty, describing his horrific 
childhood, his severe addiction to drugs and alcohol, and the fact 
that the crime was committed after Lawlor had consumed 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra notes 141–62 and accompanying text (discussing Lawlor v. 
Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013) (No. 120481).  
 2. See Brief of the Commonwealth at 5, Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 
S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013) (No. 120481) (“Lawlor was employed by the Prestwick 
Apartments as a leasing agent, and lived in an apartment one floor below Ms. 
Orange in a different wing of the same complex.”).  
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massive amounts of crack cocaine and alcohol.3 To counter the 
prosecution’s claims, the defense offered evidence of Lawlor’s 
good behavior during past incarcerations and argued that when 
in a structured environment without access to drugs or alcohol, 
Lawlor posed little—if any—threat to those around him.4  
To support this argument, the defense offered as a witness 
Dr. Mark Cunningham, a nationally renowned prison risk 
assessment expert who is exceptionally experienced in assessing 
capital defendants’ likelihood of committing future violent acts 
while imprisoned for life.5 Dr. Cunningham intended to provide 
his risk assessment of Mark Lawlor and testify that, based on 
specific factors including future context (in other words, prison) 
and Lawlor’s individualized characteristics (for example, his 
employment history, continued contact with family and friends 
while in prison, and past appraisals by correctional officers), he 
posed a low risk of future violence while in prison.6  
But the jurors never heard this risk assessment evidence. 
The trial court excluded virtually all of Dr. Cunningham’s 
testimony, citing Supreme Court of Virginia precedent as grounds 
for its decision.7 Indeed, the trial court kept out any reference to 
“general prison life” conditions based on Virginia case law.8 The 
defense could not discuss the fact that serious violent recidivism 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 16–17, Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 
738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013) (No. 120481) (describing Lawlor’s horrible past and 
his intoxication during the commission of the crime).  
 4. See Brief of the Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that 
Lawlor presented witnesses to describe his good behavior in jail).  
 5. See Homepage, http://www.markdcunningham.com/index.php, MARK D. 
CUNNINGHAM, PH.D., ABPP (last visited Sept. 7, 2013) (stating that Mr. 
Cunningham is a clinical and forensic psychologist who has provided 
“consultation and/or testimony in state or federal litigation in 42 states, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 6. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (“The defense 
sought to introduce the expert opinion of Dr. Mark Cunningham that, based on 
Mr. Lawlor’s particular character, history, and background, he would be a low 
risk for violence in prison and would adapt positively to the prison 
environment.”).  
 7. See id. (“[T]he court generally, and emphatically, excluded it because 
the testimony focused on Mr. Lawlor’s risk of serious violence in prison.”).  
 8. See id. at 46 (stating that the trial court relied on Supreme Court of 
Virginia precedent as its reason for excluding general prison evidence).  
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by all capital murderers, once imprisoned for life, is extremely 
rare.9 Nor could the defense give any explanation of exactly how 
and why the Virginia prison system is able to minimize the risk 
of such violence despite the fact that these prisons are filled with 
“dangerous” people.10 Excluding any information about the 
overall context of Lawlor’s future life prohibited the jury from 
reaching a reliable assessment of the magnitude of the risk posed 
by Lawlor, and it all but guaranteed that the jury would greatly 
overestimate the risk of future violence.11 This is because the jury 
would base its future “risk assessment” only by extrapolating 
from the information they did have—especially the extreme 
violence displayed by the capital murder itself. Such an ominous 
prediction of Lawlor’s future behavior (quite understandably) had 
a significant impact on the jurors, one that ultimately produced a 
unanimous verdict of death.12   
The trial court based its exclusion of the risk assessment 
evidence on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s case law interpreting 
Virginia’s “future dangerousness”13 statutory aggravating 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. at 33–49 (discussing the trial court’s exclusion of any mention of 
general prison information, including prison statistics); see also infra notes 94–
162 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court of Virginia’s precedent 
prohibiting general prison information).  
 10. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing the 
trial court’s exclusion of any mention of general prison information, including 
prison conditions that make prison violence less likely); see also infra notes 94–
162 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court of Virginia’s precedent 
prohibiting general prison information).  
 11. See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood 
of juries to overestimate capital defendants’ risk of future violence when they do 
not have reliable, accurate risk assessments from which they can predict future 
dangerousness).  
 12. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 18 (stating that the 
jury returned a verdict of death).  
 13. See Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future 
Dangerousness” Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines 
the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 146 (2008) 
(“‘Future dangerousness’ is a very non-technical name for a particularly 
problematic sentencing factor used in nearly every capital jurisdiction in the 
United States, directly underlying at least half of all modern era executions and 
likely playing some role in the rest.” (footnotes omitted)). Wyoming is the only 
state to use the term “future dangerousness” in its death penalty statute. See 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2012) (“The defendant poses a substantial and 
continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts 
of criminal violence.”). Most statutes refer to the notion of a defendant’s future 
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factor.14 This statute provides that  
a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the 
court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past 
criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find 
that there is a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society . . . 
and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be 
imposed.15 
Under a normal, commonsense future dangerousness assessment, 
the statute would require the jury to “predict[] . . . whether an 
individual in the criminal justice system will commit a violent 
crime in the future.”16 From its inception, the notion of future 
dangerousness as a basis for imposing the death penalty has 
caused concern.17 It seems practically impossible for one person to 
                                                                                                     
dangerousness through language referencing the defendant’s likelihood of 
future violent acts. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2012) (“[T]here is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.”). This Note refers to 
this sentencing factor as “future dangerousness” for simplicity’s sake. 
 14. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (9th ed. 2009) (describing the term 
“aggravating circumstance” to mean “[a] fact or situation that increases the 
degree of liability or culpability for a criminal act”). The terms “aggravating 
circumstance” and “aggravating factor” are used interchangeably. Id. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has determined that a state “must channel the sentencer’s 
discretion by ‘clear and objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed 
guidance,’ and that ‘make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a 
sentence of death’” when it authorizes the death penalty. Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). In order to 
channel the sentencer’s discretion pursuant to constitutional standards, “the 
trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one ‘aggravating 
circumstance’ (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.” Tuilaepa 
v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). Thus, “statutory aggravating 
circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of 
legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983). 
 15. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2013).  
 16. Brian Sites, The Danger of Future Dangerousness in Death Penalty Use, 
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 960–61 (2007) (“Future dangerousness is ultimately a 
yes-or-no decision, . . . ‘maybe’ is not an option.”). 
 17. See Eric F. Citron, Note, Sudden Death: The Legislative History of 
Future Dangerousness and the Texas Death Penalty, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
143, 154 n.56 (2006) (“There have been literally hundreds of scholarly articles 
written on the problems of the future dangerousness standard, many originating 
in the law-and-psychology community.”). 
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accurately predict another person’s future actions.18 Nonetheless, 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the future 
dangerousness aggravating factor long ago, and the factor has 
become prominent in many states’ capital sentencing schemes.19  
Virginia has a particularly long and complicated history 
with the future dangerousness aggravating factor. Unlike all 
other jurisdictions, Virginia does not interpret “future 
dangerousness” to mean an assessment of the defendant’s likely 
future behavior. Rather, the Supreme Court of Virginia has 
redefined the aggravating factor as a somewhat abstract 
evaluation of whether the defendant has “a mental inclination 
towards violence.”20 To perform this evaluation, the trier of fact is 
only allowed to consider evidence of the defendant’s past criminal 
record and history, and the circumstances surrounding the 
offense.21 Accordingly, all other evidence—including general 
prison evidence—is irrelevant to the future dangerousness 
analysis. This atypical interpretation of the future dangerousness 
aggravating factor has significant implications for the way 
Virginia capital sentencing hearings are conducted, and raises 
serious issues of fundamental fairness for Virginia capital 
defendants like Mark Lawlor.22 
This Note explores Virginia’s redefinition of the future 
dangerousness statutory aggravating factor and considers the 
constitutional implications that flow from it. Part II discusses the 
constitutionality of the future dangerousness statutory 
aggravating factor and the U.S. Supreme Court’s assessment of 
what a future dangerousness inquiry requires. Part III analyzes 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk 
Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1254 (2000) (“Sentencing a defendant to death because of 
some act he may commit in the future is troubling for those opposed to such 
teleological forecasting and seems to contradict the ‘innocent until proven guilty’ 
premise of the American judicial system.”). 
 19. See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s approval of future dangerousness and the states that have codified 
future dangerousness). 
 20. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s 
interpretation of future dangerousness).  
 21. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s 
interpretation of future dangerousness).  
 22. See infra Part V.  
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the role that future dangerousness predictions play in capital 
sentencing proceedings. Part IV surveys the Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s capital decisions concerning the issue of future 
dangerousness and prison violence risk assessments. Part V 
outlines the implications of the Virginia court’s decisions and the 
constitutional concerns that are raised. Finally, Part VI concludes 
that the current interpretation of Virginia’s future dangerousness 
statutory aggravating factor cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny and argues that substantial changes are needed to the 
Commonwealth’s capital sentencing structure. 
II. Future Dangerousness as a Constitutionally Acceptable 
Aggravating Factor 
In 1973, Texas became the first state to incorporate the 
concept of future dangerousness into its capital sentencing 
structure.23 The state’s death penalty statute required the capital 
sentencing jury to determine “whether there is a probability that 
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing threat to society.”24  If the jury answered 
in the affirmative—if it found that there was a probability of 
future dangerousness—the defendant was all but guaranteed a 
death sentence.25 But the statute failed to include any guidance 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 148 (“Future dangerousness was born in 
the 63rd Texas legislature, which incorporated it in its 1973 scramble to 
reinstate the death penalty after Furman v. Georgia.” (footnote omitted)).  
 24. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(2) (West 1973)). The future dangerousness 
question is currently written exactly the same as it was in 1973. See TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (West 2013) (providing Texas’s current 
future dangerousness question).  
 25. See Citron, supra note 17, at 155 (explaining that, although the Texas 
statute required affirmative answers to three “special questions” in order to 
sentence the defendant to death, “only the ‘future dangerousness’ question 
provided any real chance of escape from the ultimate sanction”). The other two 
special questions—“[w]hether the conduct of the defendant that caused the 
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable 
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result” and 
“whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable 
in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased”—were of no real 
significance by the time the jury reached the sentencing phase in a capital trial. 
Id. “Clearly, a verdict of murder with malice aforethought would be unlikely—
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as to what this future dangerousness inquiry entailed, leaving 
every operative word undefined.26 A challenge to the statute’s 
undefined language resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 
decision in Jurek v. Texas.27  
The defendant in Jurek alleged that Texas’s future 
dangerousness statutory question led to the arbitrary infliction of 
the death penalty because it was impossible for a jury to 
accurately predict future behavior.28 In a short, ten-sentence 
paragraph, the Court addressed this claim and determined that a 
jury’s future dangerousness inquiry does not necessarily lead to a 
capricious application of the death penalty.29 While the Court 
acknowledged that it is “not easy to predict future behavior,” the 
Court nonetheless found that it was not an impossible 
determination to make.30 In support of its assertion, the Court 
pointed to other areas of the criminal justice system—such as the 
bail and parole processes—that require a future dangerousness 
examination.31 The Court determined that “[t]he task that a 
Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory question in 
issue is thus basically no different from the task performed 
                                                                                                     
capital case or not—if the jury believed that the murder was not unreasonable 
in light of some provocation, or not even committed deliberately.” Id. 
Consequently, the jury would inevitably answer the two questions in the 
affirmative, leaving open only the question of future dangerousness. Id. at 155–
56. 
 26. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 150 n.18 (explaining that, although the 
Texas statute leaves undefined “probability,” “criminal acts of violence,” and 
“continuing threat to society,” courts have repeatedly held that the terms are 
not impermissibly vague); see also Citron, supra note 17, at 158 (“[N]ot only is 
[the Texas death penalty statute] ambiguous as to the frame of reference for the 
future dangerousness prediction, it also offers absolutely no guidance as to the 
level of certainty required for an answer of ‘yes.’”).  
 27. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).  
 28. Id. at 274 (“[T]he petitioner argues that it is impossible to predict 
future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.”).  
 29. See id. at 275–76 (discussing the future dangerousness inquiry and 
upholding Texas’s death penalty statute).  
 30. See id. at 274–75 (“It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior. 
The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it 
cannot be made.”). 
 31. See id. at 275 (discussing the other areas of the justice system in which 
future dangerousness predictions must be made). The Court noted that “any 
sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable future conduct 
when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.” Id. 
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countless times each day throughout the American system of 
criminal justice.”32 The Court thus concluded that the Texas 
statute was constitutional as written.33 
Following the Court’s approval of the dangerousness 
statutory language in Jurek, five states—Oregon, Oklahoma, 
Wyoming, Idaho, and Virginia—enacted new death penalty 
statutes that codified some form of a future dangerousness 
requirement.34 And similar to Texas’s statutory scheme, these 
newly enacted death penalty statutes left most, if not all, of the 
statutory language undefined.35 Although the terms in the future 
dangerousness statutes were left open to interpretation, it was 
clear that these statutes, including Texas’s, were passed with the 
assumption that juries would interpret future dangerousness 
statutory language according to its “common meaning.”36 That is, 
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 275–76. 
 33. See id. at 276 (finding the Texas capital sentencing scheme 
constitutional).  
 34. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 146 n.2 (noting the enactment of death 
penalty statutes in these states following Jurek). Oregon’s future dangerousness 
statute is identical to Texas’s statute. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) 
(2013) (asking the sentencer whether “there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat 
to society”). Oklahoma’s future dangerousness aggravating factor requires a 
finding that there exists “a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (2013). Wyoming requires a determination that 
the defendant “poses a substantial and continuing threat of future 
dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal violence.” WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2012). Idaho’s future dangerousness aggravating 
factor requires a finding that “[t]he defendant, by his conduct, whether such 
conduct was before, during or after the commission of the murder at hand, has 
exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a 
continuing threat to society.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2013). And 
Virginia requires a finding that “there is a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious 
threat to society.” VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 264.4(c) (2013).  
 35. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 149–50 (“The statutes are notoriously 
undefined; Texas, Oklahoma[,] and Virginia, for example, leave every operative 
word undefined.”). Idaho is the only state that provides a definition for its future 
dangerousness aggravating factor, construing its “propensity” requirement to 
denote that a person “is a willing, predisposed killer who tends toward 
destroying the life of another, one who kills with less than normal amount of 
provocation.” State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 472 (Idaho 1983). The court 
determined that “propensity assumes a proclivity, a susceptibility, and even an 
affinity toward committing the act of murder.” Id. 
 36. King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“Where 
1898 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1887 (2013) 
when engaging in a future dangerousness assessment, the jury 
would “predict [the defendant’s] future behavior.”37  
With this commonsense understanding that “future 
dangerousness” requires a forward-looking assessment into the 
capital defendant’s likely future behavior, it becomes necessary to 
determine how the jury actually goes about the process of making 
such a prediction. What factors come into play when making such 
a prediction? How exactly does the process work? The next 
section discusses what evidence prosecutors and capital 
defendants proffer in their attempts at proving or disproving 
future dangerousness to the jury.  
III. Prison Violence Risk Assessment 
Pursuant to the commonsense understanding of “future 
dangerousness,” a future dangerousness assessment under a 
state’s death penalty statute requires the jury to evaluate a 
capital defendant’s likely future behavior. Both sides present 
evidence tending to show a defendant’s probability of committing 
dangerous acts in the future, often through future dangerousness 
experts. These experts purport to engage in “risk assessments,”38 
                                                                                                     
terms used are words simple in themselves, and are used in their ordinary 
meaning, jurors are supposed to know such common meaning and terms and 
under such circumstances such common words are not necessarily to be defined 
in the charge to the jury.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
court in King determined that the future dangerousness statute was 
constitutional, noting that in Jurek, “the Supreme Court of the United States 
concluded that the submission of the issues provided by [the death penalty 
statute] . . . constitutionally guided the jury’s determination of the punishment 
issues. No special definitions of the terms of that statute were required.” Id.  
 37. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976). Texas, Oklahoma, and 
Virginia all relied on the Jurek Court’s interpretation of the future 
dangerousness language in upholding their future dangerousness statutes. See 
infra notes 80–89 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s reliance on Jurek when interpreting Virginia’s future dangerousness 
statutory aggravating factor).  
 38. See Jessica M. Tanner, “Continuing Threat” To Whom?: Risk 
Assessment in Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 381, 382–
83 (2005) (“The process of . . . determining the likelihood of future violent 
behavior is what social scientists term ‘risk assessment.’”); Sites, supra note 16, 
at 961 
A “risk assessment” involves the use of clinical, actuarial, or 
physiological methods to determine the probability that an individual 
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but the methods and data used in the different risk 
assessments lead to very different—and not always reliable—
results.  
A. The Prosecution’s Methods of Predicting Future 
Dangerousness 
In an attempt to convince the jury that the defendant will 
likely pose a future danger to society, the prosecution often 
utilizes “experts” to offer a prediction of future 
dangerousness.39 Using unscientific data in their risk 
assessments,40 these mental health professionals grossly 
overestimate the degree of risk created by capital defendants.41 
Their calculation of dangerousness—relying on subjective 
clinical assessments of the defendant42 as well as other 
                                                                                                     
will commit a violent crime in the future. Risk assessments return a 
percentage chance that a given defendant will commit a violent crime 
in the future. They are thus somewhat analogous to when weather 
forecasts give a percentage chance that certain weather will occur in 
the future. 
 39. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 159 (describing the prosecution “experts” 
as illegitimate “dangerousness diagnosticians”).  
 40. See Mark D. Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Improbable Predictions 
at Capital Sentencing: Contrasting Prison Violence Outcomes, 38 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY LAW 61, 62 (2010) (describing the analyses used by these “experts”). 
The prosecution’s “experts” often rely on “the abhorrence of the capital murder 
offense, the callousness of the defendant, the defendant’s prior community 
misconduct, and the repugnant personality features giving rise to aberrant 
behavior.” Id. Such clinical/intuitive risk analyses lead to “grave risk of future 
violence in all contexts, including prison.” Id.  
 41. See Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Integrating Base Rate 
Data in Violence Risk Assessments at Capital Sentencing, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
71, 71–72 (1998) (“Consistent with well established clinical proclivities to over-
predict violence, . . . the most notorious mental health expert testimony at 
capital sentencing has grossly overstated the magnitude of risk.”); Cunningham 
& Sorensen, supra note 40, at 63 (“If ‘threat to society’ contemplated misconduct 
of sufficient severity that a preventative intervention of death seemed 
proportional (e.g., something more than a mutual fistfight or minor assault), 
these expert predictions had a staggering error rate.”); Shapiro, supra note 13, 
at 161–62 (“Mental health professionals themselves are entirely skeptical of 
their own predictions, [and] academics appear to have unanimously accepted 
that such professionals are unreliable . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 42. See Tanner, supra note 38, at 397 (“[M]ental health experts have 
typically . . . rel[ied] primarily on subjective clinical assessments centered 
around the individual client interview. Based upon that interview, a review of 
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“common sense” factors43—is often made “to an unqualifiedly 
high degree of certainty.”44 But the fact is that these unempirical 
“psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are 
wrong in at least two out of every three cases.”45 Such inaccurate 
predictions of future dangerousness led the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) to conclude long ago that these “expert” 
opinions should not be presented in capital sentencing 
proceedings.46  
Despite the shocking overestimations by these mental health 
professionals, the Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on 
the admissibility of this type of expert testimony in Barefoot v. 
                                                                                                     
the client’s file and record, a comparison to similar cases, and a literature 
review, a professional evaluator derives an estimate of risk.”). 
 43. Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy, & Jon R. Sorensen, Assertions 
of “Future Dangerousness” at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates 
of Subsequent Prison Misconduct and Violence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 50 
(2008) (describing “common sense” factors such as the “defendant’s history of 
criminal acts in the community, including features of the capital offense; 
assertions of lack of remorse; and/or the defendant’s associated violent-prone 
disposition”).  
 44. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 159. Take, for instance, the infamous Dr. 
James P. Grigson, otherwise known as “Dr. Death.” By 1994, “Dr. Grigson had 
appeared in at least 150 capital trials on behalf of the state, and his predictions 
of future dangerousness had been used to help convict at least one-third of all 
Texas death row inmates.” Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous 
Preoccupation With Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future 
Dangerousness in Capital Cases are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV. 207, 208 
(2002). Dr. Grigson often testified that he was one hundred percent certain that 
the defendant would be dangerous in the future, and in some cases he offered 
testimony that there was “a one thousand percent chance” that the defendant 
would be a future danger. Id. at 209. Even though Dr. Grigson was eventually 
expelled from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and from the Texas 
Society of Psychiatric Physicians (TSPP), his testimony sealed the fate for 
countless capital defendants. Id. at 210. 
 45. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 161 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n for Petitioner at 14, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 
U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080)). 
 46. See id. 
[B]y 1983 the American Psychiatric Association had reached the firm 
conclusion that[] “[p]sychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a 
prediction concerning the long-term future dangerousness in a capital 
case, at least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports 
to be testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in 
this area. . . . Medical knowledge has simply not advanced to the 
point where long-term predictions—the type of testimony at issue in 
this case—may be made with even reasonable accuracy.” 
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Estelle.47 The Court did not dispute the APA’s assertion that the 
testimony was unreliable.48 Rather, it reasoned that the 
adversarial process would filter the reliable testimony from the 
unreliable.49 Through effective cross-examination and 
presentation of his own expert, the Court determined that the 
capital defendant has ample opportunity to counter the 
prosecution’s expert’s claims of dangerousness.50 As one might 
expect, these unfounded overestimations of future dangerousness 
have a significant influence on a sentencing jury despite capital 
defendants’ attempts to dispute these grave predictions.  
B. The Jury’s Tendency to Overpredict 
When conducting future dangerousness assessments, juries 
tend to overestimate severely the threat of violence posed by a 
capital defendant.51 A number of factors play a role in the jury’s 
                                                                                                     
 47. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1982). The prosecution’s psychiatrist 
in Barefoot, the notorious Dr. Grigson, testified that “whether Barefoot was in 
society at large or in a prison society there was a ‘one hundred percent and 
absolute’ chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence 
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 48. See id. at 896–902 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that errors in 
expert predictions may occur); see also id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“The APA’s best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future 
violence made by psychiatrists are wrong. . . . The Court does not dispute this 
proposition, . . . and indeed it could not do so; the evidence is overwhelming.”).  
 49. See id. at 901 (majority opinion) (“We are unconvinced, however, at 
least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the 
reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, 
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own 
side of the case.”).  
 50. See id. at 898 (“Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be 
countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but as generally so 
unreliable that it should be ignored.”).  
 51. See, e.g., Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1268–70 (discussing a 
study conducted with former capital jurors in Texas that showed the jurors’ 
extreme overestimation of future dangerousness). Jurors in the study were 
asked to estimate the probability that capital defendants would recidivate in the 
future if sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 1269. The median estimate of a given 
capital defendant’s committing another murder was 50%, compared to the 
actual observed frequency of such repeat murders by life-imprisoned inmates to 
be 0.2%. Id. In another study, a review of prison disciplinary records of a sample 
of future-danger-predicted, formerly death-sentenced inmates in Texas was 
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overestimation,52 and the prosecution’s “expert” testimony 
declaring a probability that the defendant will strike again if not 
put to death is particularly influential.53 Such a grim forecast, 
confidently made by someone who appears to be a preeminent 
specialist in the field of future-dangerousness prediction, is 
understandably persuasive in the eyes of an impressionable 
jury.54  
Because a “lack of objective information regarding the 
likelihood of repeat violence” is a critical component of jury over-
                                                                                                     
conducted following the inmates transfer to the general prison population. See 
Mark D. Cunningham, Dangerousness and Death: A Nexus in Search of Science 
and Reason, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 828, 834 (2006). This study revealed that if 
capital juries had been contemplating serious institutional violence (e.g. 
aggravated assaults with a weapon) when predicting a capital defendant’s 
future dangerousness, the juries were wrong 90% of the time. Id. If the juries 
were contemplating a homicide, they were wrong 99% of the time. Id. As Dr. 
Cunningham states, “[p]redictions of future violent conduct are subject to 
multiple faulty conceptual strategies. . . . The result of these faulty decision-
making processes is more often an overestimation of violence risk.” Id. at 833–
34. 
 52. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 834 (discussing flawed strategies 
employed by unaided lay individuals when making violence risk assessment 
judgments based on intuition and common sense). Dr. Cunningham states that 
faulty conceptual strategies employed by uninformed lay persons include: 
(a) not accurately distinguishing between actual violence risk 
variables and those intuitively believed to be predictive but that are 
not (i.e., illusory correlation); (b) not incorporating all of the available 
data and thus emphasizing variables that are most memorable or 
most consistent with personal bias, which results in faulty weighting 
(i.e., an inability to optimally weight the variables); (c) having a lack 
of knowledge of base rate data regarding violence incidence among 
similar individuals in the predicted context; (d) ignoring base rates in 
the face of specific information or when confronted with a specific 
individual; (e) relying on personal experience based on a narrow and 
skewed portion of the population under consideration; (f) having 
minimal or absent information on the accuracy of predictions; and 
(g) showing inflated confidence in the accuracy of judgment. 
Id. 
 53. See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 72 (“There is a real danger 
that a jury may be inappropriately and significantly influenced by poorly 
grounded predictions of future violence offered with great confidence, even when 
the prediction is based on intuition rather than solid scientific evidence.”). 
 54. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored 
in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a 
medical specialist’s words, equates with death itself.”).  
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prediction,55 defendants attempt to offer their own future 
dangerousness experts to counter those opinions presented by the 
prosecution. But even when defense expert testimony is 
permitted,56 it is unlikely to be as persuasive to the jury as 
prosecution expert testimony.57 Nevertheless, capital defendants 
advocate for the admission of their own future dangerousness 
experts as a means of countering the prosecution’s unscientific 
predictions of the defendants’ likely future behavior.  
C. The Defense’s Methods of Predicting Future Dangerousness 
Importantly, prison is the only relevant context for capital 
risk assessments because it is the sole alternative to the death 
penalty for a convicted capital defendant in every jurisdiction.58 
Although it is commonly believed that prison inmate violence 
among murderers is high,59 the reality is that “[m]ost capital 
defendants do not engage in serious violence in prison.”60 The 
jury would never know of this fact by means of the prosecution’s 
“expert” testimony alone, however, because such testimony does 
not discuss the context into which a convicted capital defendant 
will spend the rest of his life if spared the death penalty. Instead, 
prosecution experts merely assert generalized claims that the 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1254 (“Several factors in the 
decision-making process encourage jurors to overestimate the threat of violence 
posed by capital murderers. Foremost among these is the lack of objective 
information regarding the likelihood of repeat violence.”). 
 56. See infra notes 165–75 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s 
exclusion of defense risk assessment experts). 
 57. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 164 (“Jurors are far more likely to have 
negative opinions of opposing defense experts, and to see them as ‘hired guns,’ 
than they will of State experts.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 58. See Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 62 (“The adoption of life 
without parole as an alternative sentencing option in all 37 American 
jurisdictions utilizing the death penalty has rendered prison the only relevant 
predictive context for capital risk assessments.”). For a discussion of Virginia’s 
abolition of parole for capital offenders, see infra notes 90–93 and accompanying 
text.  
 59. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 158 (explaining that without objective 
factual information on which to base a future dangerousness prediction, juries 
“can (and apparently do) fear that failing to impose a death sentence could lead 
to high levels of in-prison violence . . . ”). 
 60. Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 62.  
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capital defendant is “dangerous.”61 Consequently, capital 
defendants proffer prison violence risk assessments that take into 
account the low levels of prison violence to demonstrate that, if 
given a life sentence, the defendant would have a statistically 
based improbability of committing future dangerous acts.62 
The risk assessments proffered by capital defendants employ 
“base rate-driven and context-specific methodology.”63 A base rate 
is “the statistical prevalence of a particular behavior in a given 
group over a set period of time”64 and is “the most important 
single piece of information necessary to make an accurate [future 
dangerousness] prediction.”65 In conducting one of these base 
rate-focused risk assessments, the expert first establishes “with 
what frequency capital offenders are violent in a particular prison 
environment.”66 The expert then adjusts the resulting 
percentage—the base rate—for specific context, including the 
level of prison security or isolation.67 This adjustment for context 
is a vital part of assessing the likelihood of future violence 
because “base rates may vary depending on the setting or 
context.”68 Finally, with the base rate as an anchor, the expert 
individualizes the risk assessment by examining the defendant’s 
“history, behavior pattern, and disposition” and formulates a 
scientifically based prediction of that defendant’s likelihood to 
commit future violent acts.69 
As previously stated, the prevalence of serious prison 
violence is very low. The yearly rate of repeat murder in prison 
                                                                                                     
 61. See supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text (discussing the 
prosecution’s “experts” and the data on which they rely to make future 
dangerousness predictions).  
 62. See Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 63 (“Expert testimony 
asserting such statistically based improbability, when it appears at capital 
sentencing, is invariably sponsored by the defense.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 63. Id. at 62.  
 64. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 73.  
 65. JOHN D. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 60 (1981).  
 66. Tanner, supra note 38, at 387. 
 67. See id. (discussing the risk assessment process).  
 68. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 75. 
 69. See id. at 87 (stating that once the base rate is determined, “[i]t is at 
this juncture that a defendant’s history, behavior pattern, and disposition 
become relevant in individualizing the risk assessment”).  
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has been found to be less than one percent for murderers in 
general.70 “Studies of capital murderers determined the base 
rates of violent rule infractions to be .06 per year or less,”71 and 
when “capital risk assessments for prison are anchored to these 
base rates, highly reliable estimates of an improbability of future 
serious violence result.”72 Conversely, “[w]hen prison risk 
estimates fundamentally deviate from or ignore these base rates, 
errors abound.”73 Unlike risk assessments that incorporate prison 
violence base rates (the defense’s risk assessments), risk 
assessments that use only unscientific, “common sense” data (the 
prosecution’s risk assessments) are not reliable evaluations of 
that defendant’s likelihood to commit violence acts in the future.74  
Capital defendants recognize the importance of introducing 
base rate-focused risk assessments to the jury in order to counter 
intuition-based, unreliable risk assessments offered by the 
prosecution. Defendants maintain that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, their proffered risk assessments are 
constitutionally required as both rebuttal and mitigating 
evidence.75 Nevertheless, Virginia consistently denies capital 
defendants the opportunity to introduce these scientifically based 
risk assessments, violating fundamental constitutional mandates 
and departing from widespread acceptance of this evidence in 
other jurisdictions.  
                                                                                                     
 70. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1256 (“The yearly rate of 
repeat murder in prison has been found to be .002 or less for murderers in 
general.”). The repeat murder rate is about .002 for murderers commuted from 
death sentences to life in prison sentences. Id. And “[t]his rate is consistent in 
situations where capital murderers serving life without parole and capital 
murderers serving death sentences were placed in the general prisoner 
population.” Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 71. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 832 (“Past community violence is 
not strongly or consistently associated with prison violence; current offense, 
prior convictions, and escape history are only weakly associated with prison 
misconduct; and the severity of the offense is not a good predictor of prison 
adjustment.”).  
 75. See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text (discussing the 
arguments put forth by Virginia capital defendants why such risk assessments 
should be admitted in Virginia capital sentencing proceedings).  
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IV. Future Dangerousness and Risk Assessment in Virginia 
Capital Cases 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Jurek,76 Virginia 
followed Texas’s lead and enacted a new capital punishment 
statute that incorporated a future dangerousness statutory 
aggravating factor.77 The Commonwealth’s statutory scheme 
provides that a capital defendant is eligible for the death penalty 
only if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt the 
presence of at least one of two statutory aggravating factors: a 
finding of future dangerousness or a finding that the crime was 
outrageously or wantonly vile.78 The future dangerousness 
                                                                                                     
 76. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing Jurek).  
 77. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146 (Va. 1978) (stating 
that the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Commonwealth’s modern death 
penalty statutes in 1977 following the pattern approved in Jurek); see also Jason 
J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 58 
(1999) (“After Jurek, Virginia passed death penalty statutes that included 
language similar to that approved in Jurek. Included in these statutes was the 
future dangerousness inquiry.”). 
 78. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(C) (2013) (providing 
Virginia’s capital punishment statutory scheme). Two statutes comprise the 
Commonwealth’s death penalty scheme: Section 19.2-264.2 and Section 19.2-
264.4(C) of the Virginia Code. Section 19.2-264.2 dictates the conditions for the 
imposition of the death penalty, and states:  
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for 
which the death penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall 
not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consideration of 
the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find that 
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society 
or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands 
charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in 
that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to 
the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be imposed. 
Id. § 19.2-264.2. Section 19.2-264.4(C) dictates the sentencing proceeding in a 
capital case, and states: 
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth 
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability 
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he 
is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct 
in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or 
aggravated battery to the victim. 
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statutory aggravating factor was originally determined to require 
the jury to assess whether the defendant displays a probability of 
committing future criminal acts.79 As this section discusses, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of this statutory 
aggravating factor has, over time, diverged from the 
commonsense understanding of “future dangerousness,” and 
Virginia’s death penalty statute is now construed in such a way 
to completely bar from admission defense-sponsored, base rate-
focused risk assessment evidence. 
A. In the Beginning: Smith v. Commonwealth80 
The first case to challenge Virginia’s new death penalty 
statutory scheme came in Smith v. Commonwealth. The 
petitioner in Smith brought a claim similar to the one brought in 
Jurek—that is, the petitioner argued that the statutory 
definitions of the two aggravating circumstances were so vague 
as to be unconstitutional.81 The Supreme Court of Virginia 
rejected Smith’s future dangerousness argument, quoting a 
majority of the Jurek opinion as support for its decision.82 Similar 
to the Jurek Court’s reasoning, the Smith court noted that 
although predicting future dangerousness is not easy, “prediction 
of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the 
decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system.”83 
                                                                                                     
Id. § 19.2-264.4(C). Virginia’s second aggravating factor—that the defendant’s 
conduct in committing the crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery 
to the victim,” id. § 19.2-264.2, is not discussed in this Note.  
 79. See infra notes 80–89 (discussing the Supreme Court of Virginia’s 
original interpretation of the future dangerousness statutory aggravating 
factor).  
 80. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978), cert. denied, 441 
U.S. 967 (1979).  
 81. See id. at 148 (stating Smith’s claim that the statutory definitions are 
unconstitutional because they “vest the sentencing authority with standardless 
sentencing power”).  
 82. See Solomon, supra note 77, at 58 (“The [Virginia] court looked to the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jurek and quoted nearly all of the 
Jurek opinion relating to future dangerousness.”).  
 83. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 
(1976)).  
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The Virginia court noted that there is no constitutional error 
when the jury bases its prediction of future dangerousness on the 
defendant’s prior criminal history, stating that 
[i]f the defendant has been previously convicted of “criminal 
acts of violence,” i.e., serious crimes against the person 
committed by intentional acts of unprovoked violence, there is 
a reasonable “probability,” i.e., a likelihood substantially 
greater than a mere possibility, that he would commit similar 
crimes in the future. Such a probability fairly supports the 
conclusion that society would be faced with a “continuing 
serious threat.”84 
In a footnote to this discussion, the court mentioned a secondary 
statutory predicate upon which the jury may base its prediction 
of future dangerousness: the circumstances surrounding the 
offense.85 Virginia’s highest court determined that the statute 
sufficiently guided the jury’s discretion and was thus 
constitutional under Jurek.86  
The Smith decision was the first time that the Supreme 
Court of Virginia interpreted the Commonwealth’s new statutory 
scheme to require that the jury look backwards when analyzing a 
defendant’s future dangerousness.87 This backwards-looking 
interpretation significantly influenced the development of the 
court’s death penalty jurisprudence88 and set the tone for the 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).  
 85. See id. at 149 n.4 (“It should be noted that, while prior criminal conduct 
is the Principal [sic] predicate, the statute provides a further predicate, Viz., ‘the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which (the 
defendant) is accused.’”).  
 86. See id. at 148, 151 (holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally 
vague). 
 87. See id. at 148–49 (indicating that the two predicates upon which a 
sentencer can predict future dangerousness are the defendant’s prior criminal 
history and the circumstances surrounding the offense—two backwards-looking 
predicates).  
 88. See, e.g., Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 283 (Va. 1986) 
(determining that unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct support a future 
dangerousness finding); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Va. 
1985) (stating that the jury is permitted to consider the “circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the offense” and the “heinousness of the crime” 
as determinative of future dangerousness), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985); 
Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (Va. 1983) (stating that the 
“heinous circumstances surrounding this homicide” is the only evidence needed 
to support a finding of future dangerousness), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983); 
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admissibility (or, rather, nonadmissibility) of base rate-focused 
risk assessment evidence.89
B. Abolition of Parole in Virginia Creates a New “Society” 
The Virginia General Assembly abolished parole for felony 
offenses—which include capital murder90—in 1995.91 A defendant 
convicted of capital murder in Virginia now faces only two 
possible sentences: life in prison without the possibility of parole, 
or death.92 Because a convicted capital defendant will never be 
released into society at large even if his life is spared, the only 
“society” to which the defendant might pose a threat is prison 
society.93 Knowing this, capital defendants have shifted their 
defense strategy to focus on the likelihood that they will be a 
continuing threat to prison society. But the Supreme Court of 
Virginia, over time, has frustrated these efforts. 
                                                                                                     
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 172, 180 (Va. 1982) (providing the 
defendant’s prior convictions as evidence of future dangerousness); Clark v. 
Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 789–90 (Va. 1979) (describing the defendant’s 
lack of remorse and prior criminal record as evidence of future dangerousness), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).   
 89. See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme 
Court of Virginia’s more recent jurisprudence surrounding the 
admission/exclusion of risk assessment evidence).  
 90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-30 (2013) (“Any person who commits capital 
murder, murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree, voluntary 
manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter, shall be guilty of a felony.”). 
Capital murder includes fifteen statutorily defined offenses, including murder 
for hire, murder during a commission of a robbery, and murder of a law-
enforcement officer. Id. § 18.2-31. 
 91. See id. § 53.1-165.1 (stating that the provisions for parole do not apply 
“to any sentence imposed or to any prisoner incarcerated upon a conviction for a 
felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995”). Capital defendants who 
are sentenced to life in prison do not have the option to petition for geriatric 
parole. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (stating that geriatric parole—parole that may be 
granted only after the convict reaches the age of sixty-five—is not eligible to 
those persons who were convicted for a Class 1 felony offense). Thus, life 
actually means life for capital defendants in Virginia.  
 92. See id. § 19.2-264.4(A) (“In case of trial by jury, where a sentence of 
death is not recommended, the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment 
for life.”).  
 93. See id. (providing the only two options that a capital defendant faces if 
he or she is convicted: life in prison without the possibility of parole, or death). 
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1. An Attempt to Introduce General Prison Evidence Through a 
Redefinition of “Society” 
Initially, capital defendants argued that, following the 
abolition of parole, the statutory definition of “society” should be 
limited to prison society because that was the only society in 
which a capital defendant would spend the remainder of his life.94 
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument outright, 
noting that the statute “requires that the jury make a factual 
determination whether the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society.”95 The statute does not limit the definition of “society” to 
prison society simply because a defendant is ineligible for 
parole.96 Because the court was unwilling to “rewrite the statute 
to restrict its scope,” it concluded that the statutory term 
“society” denotes society at large—a society into which the capital 
defendant will never be released.97 
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the 
statutory definition of “society” is not exclusively limited to prison 
society, capital defendants were still eager to introduce evidence 
about general prison conditions, including security measures 
taken to prevent violence. Defendants argued that evidence about 
prison conditions was relevant as both mitigation98 and rebuttal99 
                                                                                                     
 94. See Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 878 (Va. 2000) (“[The 
defendant] argues that, since he is ineligible for parole after being convicted of 
these offenses, the only society that should be considered in this case for 
purposes of ‘future dangerousness’ is prison society.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 
(2001).  
 95. Id. at 879. 
 96. See id. (“The statute does not limit this [future dangerousness] 
consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is ineligible for parole.”). 
 97. Id. See also Tanner, supra note 38, at 394 (“[T]he court instead read the 
statute to permit the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant posed a ‘probability’ of serious violence to a community into which he 
would never, in fact, be released.”).  
 98. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284–85 (2004) (defining relevant 
mitigating evidence as “evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some 
fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have 
mitigating value” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
 99. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(determining that a defendant is denied due process of law when a capital 
defendant is not allowed to present all mitigating evidence—i.e. when a death 
sentence is imposed, at least in part, “on the basis of information which he had 
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evidence to demonstrate that they would not pose a future danger 
if the jury chose to spare their lives.100 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia, however, rejected the arguments on both fronts. 
2. An Attempt to Introduce General Prison Evidence as Mitigating 
Evidence 
The Supreme Court of Virginia first rejected defendants’ 
mitigation argument in Cherrix v. Commonwealth.101 Relying on 
a footnote in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Lockett v. Ohio,102 
the Virginia court noted that a trial court has discretion to 
“exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s 
character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”103 
The court determined that because general information about 
prisons does not pertain to a defendant’s history or experience, a 
trial court could appropriately exclude such prison evidence as 
irrelevant.104 The court went on to distinguish the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding in Skipper v. South Carolina,105 which required 
the admission of evidence surrounding the defendant’s own prior 
                                                                                                     
no opportunity to deny or explain”). 
 100. See Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (arguing 
that evidence regarding the general nature of prison life and its effect on the 
capital defendant’s future dangerousness through testimony of a penologist, 
sociologist, and other witnesses was admissible as mitigating evidence), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999); Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 892–93 
(Va. 2001) (arguing that evidence “describing the daily inmate routine, general 
prison conditions, and security measures” of maximum-security prisons was 
admissible as rebuttal evidence), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001).  
 101. Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).  
 102. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The Court in Lockett held that 
“the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but 
the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 
less than death.” Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted). The Court stated in a footnote to 
this holding, however, that nothing in the Court’s decision “limits the traditional 
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the 
defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.” Id. at 
604 n.12. 
 103. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 n.12).  
 104. See id. (“We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that ‘what a 
person may expect in the penal system’ is not relevant mitigation evidence.”).  
 105. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). 
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jail behavior, stating that “none of the [general prison] evidence 
proffered at trial addressed Cherrix’s ability to conform or his 
experience in conforming to prison life, as the defendant’s 
evidence did in Skipper.”106 Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
made clear that information concerning general prison conditions 
alone would not be admitted as mitigating evidence in Virginia 
capital sentencing proceedings. 
3. An Attempt to Introduce General Prison Evidence as Rebuttal 
Evidence 
Virginia’s highest court rejected the argument that general 
prison life evidence serves as rebuttal evidence in Burns v. 
Commonwealth.107 In Burns, the court first noted that the 
Commonwealth did not argue anything concerning specific prison 
conditions or the likelihood that a prisoner would commit violent 
crimes while in prison.108 Thus, the general “prison life” evidence 
that the defendant attempted to offer would not actually rebut a 
specific argument made by the prosecutor.109  
The court also determined that broad “prison life” evidence 
could not be proffered as rebuttal evidence to the 
Commonwealth’s general future dangerousness claim.110 Because 
                                                                                                     
 106. Cherrix, 513 S.E. at 653 n.4 (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4); see also 
Tanner, supra note 38, at 392–93 (“The court found that the proffered evidence 
regarding the ‘general nature of prison life,’ as opposed to the specific evidence 
of the defendant’s own prior jail behavior in Skipper, did not pertain to the 
defendant’s history and experience and therefore, was inadmissible as 
mitigation evidence.”).  
 107. See Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 894 (Va. 2001) (“[W]e find 
no error in the circuit court’s decision quashing the subpoena directed to the 
Department of Corrections and refusing to admit evidence about prison life in a 
maximum security prison in rebuttal to the Commonwealth’s evidence in this 
case of Burns’ future dangerousness.”), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 621 (2001).  
 108. See id. at 893 (“[T]he Commonwealth offered no such evidence 
regarding the nature of prison life for a defendant convicted of capital murder or 
any other felony. Nor did the Commonwealth introduce evidence about the 
number of violent crimes committed in prison or the likelihood that a prisoner 
could escape.”). 
 109. See id. (“Burns’ evidence was not in rebuttal to any evidence concerning 
prison life.”).  
 110. See id. (“Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life in a 
maximum security facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in 
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the court interprets Virginia’s death penalty statute to require 
the jury to look at particular aspects of the defendant when 
addressing future dangerousness,111 the court stated that the 
relevant inquiry is “not whether [the defendant] could commit 
criminal acts of violence in the future but whether he would.”112 
Essentially, the court determined that information involving the 
general nature of the prison system and the security measures 
taken within prisons to secure inmates has no bearing on 
whether a defendant possesses the propensity to commit acts of 
violence in the future.113 
C. Reforming the Defense Strategy 
Following the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decisions 
regarding general prison evidence, defense attorneys adjusted 
their strategy in an attempt to comply with the court’s rulings. 
Recognizing that general “prison life” data was not admissible as 
mitigation or rebuttal evidence, capital defendants attempted to 
offer individualized assessments, which incorporated prison data 
into the evaluation, to demonstrate the defendant’s improbability 
of committing violent acts in the future.114 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia quickly rejected this revised approach in Juniper v. 
                                                                                                     
rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness such as that presented in this 
case.”).  
 111. See id. (“[T]he focus must be on the particular facts of Burns’ history 
and background, and the circumstances of his offense.”).  
 112. Id.  
 113. See id. (“[A] determination of future dangerousness revolves around an 
individual defendant and a specific crime. Evidence regarding the general 
nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that 
inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness.”).  
 114. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (“The defense 
sought to introduce the expert opinion . . . that, based on [the defendant’s] 
particular character, history, and background, he would be a low risk for 
violence in prison and would adapt positively to the prison environment.”). 
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Commonwealth,115 Porter v. Commonwealth,116 and Morva v. 
Commonwealth.117  
1. Juniper v. Commonwealth 
In Juniper, the defendant requested that his court-appointed 
psychologist, Dr. Thomas Pasquale, testify that “Juniper’s risk 
assessment for future dangerousness was different in a prison 
setting from that in an ‘open community.’”118 The Supreme Court 
of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s denial of this request, stating 
that  
[w]hile Dr. Pasquale may not have sought to offer specific 
evidence on a day in the life of a prisoner, as in Cherrix, he 
offered nothing to the trial court to support his opinion as 
being based on Juniper’s individual characteristics that would 
affect his future adaptability in prison and thus relate to a 
defendant-specific assessment of future dangerousness.119 
The court determined that the psychologist’s testimony was not 
sufficiently individualized to the defendant so as to conform to 
the court’s prior decisions, and the testimony was properly 
precluded as irrelevant.120 
2. Porter v. Commonwealth 
In Porter, the defense again attempted to introduce evidence 
concerning the defendant’s risk of future dangerousness in a 
narrowly tailored way. The defendant requested the appointment 
of Prison Expert Dr. Mark D. Cunningham “as an expert on the 
assessment of the risk of violence by prison inmates and, in 
                                                                                                     
 115. Juniper v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383 (Va. 2006), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. 960 (2006). 
 116. Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 556 
U.S. 1189 (2009). 
 117. Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553 (Va. 2009), cert. denied, 131 
S.Ct. 97 (2010).  
 118. Juniper, 626 S.E.2d at 422. 
 119. Id. at 424. 
 120. See id. (“The trial court thus correctly barred Dr. Pasquale’s 
generalized testimony and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.”).  
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particular, the risk of future dangerousness posed by the 
defendant if incarcerated in a Virginia penitentiary for life.”121 In 
support of this request, the defense claimed that the Supreme 
Court of Virginia’s prior decisions denying the introduction of 
such evidence were decided incorrectly, arguing that some 
evidence of prison life must be allowed to properly assess and 
predict a defendant’s future dangerousness.122 Porter argued that 
“context and statistical and actuarial data . . . are indispensable 
to the determination of risk” because “it is manifestly impossible 
for a defendant adequately to explain why he is not a continuing 
serious threat to society without introducing evidence of the 
conditions of prison incarceration, including prison security and 
the actual rates of serious criminal violence in prison.”123  
In response to Porter’s request, Virginia’s highest court 
reiterated, as it had in its prior decisions, that Virginia’s death 
penalty statute dictates that a defendant’s future dangerousness 
should only be determined by looking at three specific criteria: 
the defendant’s past criminal record, prior history, and the 
circumstances surrounding the offense.124 Because Dr. 
Cunningham’s report involved a review of general prison data 
and conditions—and did not exclusively focus on the three 
criteria dictated by the statute—the trial court properly excluded 
the risk assessment as irrelevant to the question of future 
dangerousness.125 
                                                                                                     
 121. Porter, 661 S.E.2d at 435.  
 122. See id. at 436 (“In his Prison Expert Motion, however, Porter primarily 
focused on criticizing prior decisions of this Court regarding prison risk 
assessment experts and lauding the virtues of various statistical modes of 
analysis to project rates of prison inmate violence.”).  
 123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 124. See id. at 437 (“The plain directive of these statutes is that the 
determination of future dangerousness is focused on the defendant’s ‘past 
criminal record,’ ‘prior history’ and ‘the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offense.’”).  
 125. See id. at 442 (“Porter’s proffer in the Prison Expert Motion fails to 
address the statutory factors under Code § 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C) as 
being individualized and particularized as to Porter’s prior history, conviction 
record and the circumstances of the crime.”).  
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3. Morva v. Commonwealth 
With these decisions as precedent, capital defendants once 
more adjusted their defense strategy knowing that they were 
fighting an uphill battle. In Morva, the defense again requested 
that Dr. Mark Cunningham be appointed as an Expert on Prison 
Risk Assessment.126 And again the defense argued that a risk 
assessment expert was needed in order to effectively present 
mitigating evidence and to rebut assertions of future 
dangerousness by the Commonwealth.127 This case was 
distinguishable from prior cases, argued the defense, because 
Morva’s proffered risk assessment was much more individualized 
than those proffered in past cases.128 Morva stated that the risk 
assessment in Porter was rejected because “[a]t no place in the 
motion [did Porter] proffer that Dr. Cunningham’s statistical 
analysis of a projected prison environment [would] focus . . . on 
the particular facts of [his] history and background, and the 
circumstances of his offense.”129 Morva’s proffered risk 
assessment, on the other hand, integrated individualized 
characteristics into Dr. Cunningham’s statistical analysis and 
thus conformed to the court’s risk assessment precedent.130 Dr. 
Cunningham proposed to “factor into his statistical analysis 
individualized characteristics that have been shown to reduce the 
likelihood of future violent behavior in prison, including Morva’s 
                                                                                                     
 126. See Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 561 (Va. 2009) (noting 
the defense’s motion for Dr. Cunningham’s appointment).  
 127. See id. at 562  
Morva stated that he could not “effectively rebut assertions of ‘future 
dangerousness’ by the Commonwealth unless he [were] given the 
tools with which to inform the jury how to make reliable assessments 
of the likelihood of serious violence by an individual defendant in [a] 
prison setting—including security and the actual prevalence of 
serious violence” in a prison setting, which Dr. Cunningham’s 
testimony would provide. 
 128. See id. at 563 (“Morva claims that the proffer provided by Dr. 
Cunningham in this case is distinguishable from the proffer we held insufficient 
in Porter.”).  
 129. Id. (citations omitted).  
 130. See id. (“Due to the integration of these factors into the analysis, Morva 
claims that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony would have been ‘individualized’ to 
Morva rather than simply a generalization applicable to any convicted 
murderer.”).  
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prior behavior while incarcerated, age, level of educational 
attainment, and appraisals of his security requirements during 
prior incarceration.”131  
In response to the defense’s argument, the Commonwealth 
cited the court’s prior decisions and contended that Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony was not relevant as mitigating evidence 
because his “testimony would have related to conditions of 
confinement, not to Morva, and that such testimony, therefore, 
was not ‘particularized’ to Morva.”132 The Commonwealth also 
argued that because it had not introduced any evidence 
concerning Morva’s potential prison life—but, instead, limited its 
evidence “to the statutory requirements consisting of Morva’s 
prior history and the circumstances surrounding the offense”—
Dr. Cunningham’s assessment did not rebut any specific evidence 
concerning prison life.133 
The Supreme Court of Virginia once again reiterated the 
principle that “[t]he specific language of the controlling statutes, 
Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C), dictates what evidence is 
relevant to the inquiry concerning future dangerousness.”134 This 
language directs that the “relevant inquiry is not whether [a 
defendant] could commit criminal acts of violence in the future 
but whether he would.”135 Thus, the death penalty statutes define 
the relevant evidence regarding the issue of future 
dangerousness, and a defendant’s probability of committing 
future acts of violence is not determined based on the 
Commonwealth’s ability to secure the defendant in prison but 
rather the defendant’s history and the circumstances surrounding 
the defendant’s offense.136  
The court went on to state that “[t]o be admissible, evidence 
relating to a prison environment must connect the specific 
characteristics of the particular defendant to his future 
                                                                                                     
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 563–64. 
 134. Id. at 564. 
 135. Id. (quoting Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893 (Va. 2001)).  
 136. See id. at 565 (“Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C) do not put at issue 
the Commonwealth’s ability to secure the defendant in prison. The relevant 
evidence surrounding a determination of future dangerousness consists of the 
defendant’s history and the circumstances of the defendant’s offense.”).  
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adaptability in the prison environment.”137 If the defense wishes 
to present evidence of conditions of prison life and the security 
measures used in maximum security facilities, the defense must 
ensure that the evidence “is specific to the defendant on trial and 
relevant to that specific defendant’s ability to adjust to prison 
life.”138 The court then determined that Dr. Cunningham’s 
proffered testimony of prison life was inadmissible because it 
considered “general factors concerning prison procedure and 
security that are not individualized as to Morva’s prior history, 
conviction record, or the circumstances of his offense.”139 Thus, 
Dr. Cunningham’s testimony was properly excluded by the trial 
court.140 
D. Where We End Up: Lawlor v. Commonwealth 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Morva gave 
capital defense attorneys a scintilla of hope. In its ruling, the 
court acknowledged that evidence relating to the prison 
                                                                                                     
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 566. The court discussed the different aspects of Dr. 
Cunningham’s evaluation that made the evidence inadmissible. Dr. 
Cunningham proposed to testify about “Virginia Department of Corrections’ 
procedures and security interventions that would act to significantly reduce the 
likelihood of an inmate engaging in serous violence in prison.” Id. at 565. But 
the court noted that “Dr. Cunningham does not claim that the use or 
effectiveness of such interventions is related in any way to Morva’s individual 
history, conviction record, or circumstances of his offense.” Id. The court then 
went on to explain itself:  
The fact that being an inmate in a single cell, locked down twenty-
three hours a day, with individual or small group exercise, and 
shackled movement under escort would greatly reduce opportunity 
for serious violence toward others, is not particular to Morva. It is 
true for any other inmate as well, and it is evidence of the 
effectiveness of general prison security, which is not relevant to the 
issue of Morva’s future dangerousness. Whether offered by an expert, 
or anyone else, evidence of prison life and the security measures used 
in a prison environment are not relevant to future dangerousness 
unless it connects the specific characteristics of a particular 
defendant to his future adaptability in the prison environment. 
Id. at 565–66.  
 140. See id. at 566 (“[T]he circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion to appoint Dr. Cunningham as an expert for Morva.”).  
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environment—evidence that the defense would like to offer as 
rebuttal and mitigation to the Commonwealth’s claim that a 
capital defendant will be dangerous in the future—may be 
admitted so long as it was properly individualized.141 It seemed 
that the court had not foreclosed the introduction of general 
prison evidence completely. This notion was quickly challenged in 
Lawlor v. Commonwealth. 
In Lawlor, the defense sought to introduce Dr. Mark 
Cunningham’s expert opinion—as both mitigating and rebuttal 
evidence—that, “based on Mr. Lawlor’s particular character, 
history, and background, he would be a low risk for violence in 
prison and would adapt positively to the prison environment.”142 
Although the trial court admitted Dr. Cunningham as an expert 
witness, the trial court rejected most of his testimony on the issue 
of future dangerousness because the testimony included Dr. 
Cunningham’s expert opinion regarding Lawlor’s likelihood to 
pose a future threat of danger to prison society only.143 Dr. 
Cunningham attempted to discuss Lawlor’s “specific employment 
history, continued contact with family and friends while in 
prison, and past appraisals by correctional officers,” and would 
have testified that these factors are “predictive that Mr. Lawlor 
represents a low likelihood of committing acts of violence while in 
                                                                                                     
 141. See id. at 565  
To be admissible, evidence relating to a prison environment must 
connect the specific characteristics of the particular defendant to his 
future adaptability in the prison environment. . . . It must be evidence 
peculiar to the defendant’s character, history, and background in 
order to be relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry. . . . 
Conditions of prison life and the security measures utilized in a 
maximum security facility are not relevant to the future dangerousness 
inquiry unless such evidence is specific to the defendant on trial and 
relevant to that specific defendant’s ability to adjust to prison life. 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 142. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42; see also Lawlor v. 
Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (Va. 2013) (“Lawlor argues that Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony was not about generalized prison conditions. He 
argues it was sufficiently particularized based on attributes such as his age, 
prior behavior while incarcerated, education, and employment history, which 
are admissible under Morva.”).  
 143. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (“Although brief 
snippets of Dr. Cunningham’s testimony were not excluded, the court generally, 
and emphatically, excluded it because the testimony focused on Mr. Lawlor’s 
risk of serious violence in prison.”).  
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prison.”144 The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s 
objections to this testimony based on the Commonwealth’s 
argument that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s prior decision 
made clear that the issue of future dangerousness may not be 
limited to prison society.145 The trial court reasoned that “when 
[Lawlor] or his witness tried to narrow the [statutory] language 
from ‘society’ to ‘prison society,’” it would be “misleading to the 
jury.”146 
1. Lawlor’s Risk Assessment as Rebuttal Evidence 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia took each of the 
defense’s arguments in turn. Concerning the argument that Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony was admissible as rebuttal evidence, 
the defense argued that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony did not 
merely discuss general prison conditions and was sufficiently 
particularized to the defendant as required by the court’s decision 
in Morva.147 The defense argued that the trial court erred in 
                                                                                                     
 144. Id. at 44–45 (emphasis added). Dr. Cunningham’s testimony would 
have concluded with the following:  
Q: Have you reached an opinion, to a reasonable degree of 
psychological certainty, based on all of the factors relevant to your 
studies of prison risk assessment, as to what Mark Lawlor’s risk level 
is for committing acts of violence while incarcerated? And if so, what 
is your opinion? 
A: Yes. It is my opinion based on my analysis of all of the relevant 
risk factors which are specific to Mr. Lawlor’s prior history and 
background, that Mr. Lawlor represents a very low risk for 
committing acts of violence while incarcerated. 
Q: Are all of your opinions concerning the above questions and 
answers about Mr. Lawlor grounded in scientific research and peer 
reviewed scientific literature? 
A: Yes. 
Id. at 45.  
 145. See Brief of the Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 36 (“The 
Commonwealth argued, and the [trial] court agreed, that th[e] [Supreme Court 
of Virginia] has made clear that the issue of future dangerousness may not be 
limited to prison society.”). 
 146. Id.  
 147. See Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 565 (Va. 2009) (“To be 
admissible, evidence relating to a prison environment must connect the specific 
characteristics of the particular defendant to his future adaptability in the 
prison environment.”).  
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excluding the testimony due to the fact that it was limited to the 
prison environment because if Lawlor was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, “prison society would be the only society to which 
he could pose a risk.”148  
Addressing this argument, the court emphasized that “the 
question of future dangerousness is about the defendant’s 
volition, not his opportunity, to commit acts of violence. Evidence 
of custodial restrictions on opportunity therefore is not 
admissible.”149 Citing Morva v. Commonwealth,150 the court 
reiterated that the issue “is not whether the defendant is 
physically capable of committing violence, but whether he has the 
mental inclination to do so.”151 Because Dr. Cunningham’s 
testimony was limited to prison society only,152 it was irrelevant 
to the statutory language that requires a future-dangerousness 
assessment to consider society as a whole.153 The court 
determined that “[t]o be admissible as evidence rebutting the 
future dangerousness aggravating factor under the statutes, 
expert opinion testimony must not narrowly assess the 
defendant’s continuing threat to prison society alone.”154  As such, 
the court determined that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony was 
properly excluded as irrelevant to the issue of future 
dangerousness.155 
                                                                                                     
 148. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (Va. 2013).  
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra notes 126–39 and accompanying text (discussing Morva).  
 151. Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 882.  
 152. See id. (“It expressed Dr. Cunningham’s opinion of Lawlor’s risk of 
future violence in prison society only, rather than society as a whole.”).  
 153. See id. at 883 (“‘[The statute] requires that the jury make a factual 
determination whether the defendant ‘would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.’ The statute does 
not limit this consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is ineligible for 
parole.’” (quoting Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 879 (Va. 2000)).  
 154. Id.  
 155. See id. (stating that “evidence concerning a defendant’s probability of 
committing future violent acts, limited to the penal environment, is not relevant 
to consideration of the future dangerousness aggravating factor set forth” in the 
statute). 
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2. Lawlor’s Risk Assessment as Mitigating Evidence 
The defense also argued that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony 
was admissible as mitigating evidence because jurors could 
reasonably find “that evidence of Mr. Lawlor’s low risk of violence 
in prison (where he would be spending his entire life) warranted 
a sentence less than death.”156 The defense maintained that Dr. 
Cunningham’s testimony did not constitute general evidence 
about what a person may expect in the prison setting, but rather 
his testimony concerned the defendant’s “specific characteristics, 
such as his age, employment history, and ongoing connections 
with friends and family.”157  
In response to this argument, the court noted that “[a]s with 
evidence rebutting the future dangerousness aggravating factor, 
the relevant inquiry is narrowly focused on whether the 
particular defendant is inclined to commit violence in prison, not 
whether prison security or conditions of confinement render him 
incapable of committing such violence.”158 The court determined 
that to satisfy Morva’s standard, “the evidence must consist of 
more than the recitation of shared attributes as the basis for 
predicting similar behavior.”159 Statistical evidence regarding 
attributes shared by the defendant with others, and statistical 
models based on that evidence predicting the likelihood of 
violence in the future, are irrelevant.160 Dr. Cunningham’s 
proffered testimony merely 
                                                                                                     
 156. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 47.  
 157. Id. at 48–49.  
 158. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 883 (Va. 2013). The court 
went on to note that “testimony relevant to a defendant’s propensity to commit 
violence while incarcerated necessarily must be personalized to the defendant 
based on his specific, individual past behavior or record. Otherwise it cannot 
constitute evidence of the defendant’s personal character and would be 
irrelevant even for purposes of mitigation.” Id. at 883–84. 
 159. Id. at 884.  
 160. See id.  
[T]he mere fact that an attribute is shared by others from whom a 
statistical model has been compiled, and that the statistical model 
predicts certain behavior, is neither relevant to the defendant’s 
character nor a foundation for expert opinion. . . . Merely stating that 
the percentage of violent crimes committed by a specified 
demographic group sharing one of the defendant’s attributes is lower, 
based on statistical models, than others who do not share it does not 
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(a) suppl[ied] an item of demographic data coupled with an 
unexplained, conclusory opinion that the datum indicates 
Lawlor will present a low risk of violence while incarcerated or 
(b) la[id] the foundation that the opinion is based on statistical 
models. While each datum is extracted from Lawlor’s personal 
history, it sheds no light on his character, why he committed 
his past crimes and the crime for which he stood convicted, or 
how would it influence or affect his behavior while 
incarcerated.161 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court 
did not err by excluding Dr. Cunningham’s testimony.162 
V. Argument 
Lawlor redefined Virginia’s future dangerousness 
aggravating factor entirely. In effect, the redefined aggravating 
factor no longer requires capital juries to perform a forward-
looking risk assessment when conducting a future-dangerousness 
analysis.163 Virginia capital juries are now required to conduct a 
character-based evaluation to determine a defendant’s likelihood 
of committing future violent acts.164 This section discusses the 
court’s redefinition of the future dangerousness aggravating 
factor, highlighting the ways in which this redefinition 
completely changes the future dangerousness game in Virginia—
drastically diverging from every other jurisdiction’s 
interpretation of the aggravating factor—and runs afoul of both 
                                                                                                     
suffice. 
(citations omitted).  
 161. Id. at 885. The court held that one proffered answer was admissible, 
namely one that “establishes the fact that Lawlor did not engage in violent 
behavior during past periods of incarceration.” Id. However, this fact was 
already known to the jury through other evidence and consequently the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion. Id. 
 162. See id. (“In short, the proffered testimony is not probative of Lawlor’s 
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison. 
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these 
questions and answers.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 163. See infra notes 179–79 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
redefinition of the future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor). 
 164. See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
redefinition into a character-based assessment). 
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the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
A. The Realities of Lawlor 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Lawlor was 
novel in many respects. Lawlor was the first decision to place an 
absolute bar on admission of base rate-focused risk assessments 
in Virginia capital trials.165 It also marked the first time that the 
court definitively redefined Virginia’s future dangerousness 
aggravating factor to be a character assessment rather than a 
forward-looking dangerousness assessment.166 And, most 
importantly, the decision was the first time that the Virginia 
court departed so radically from all other interpretations of 
future dangerousness.167 These “firsts,” taken together, have 
significant constitutional implications for the Virginia death 
penalty statutory scheme.  
1. Total Exclusion of Base Rate-Focused Risk Assessments 
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Lawlor that Dr. 
Cunningham’s risk assessment testimony was not relevant as 
mitigating or rebuttal evidence and thus was inadmissible.168 
Quite simply, the court rejected an unchallenged risk assessment 
that would have taken into account every aspect of the 
                                                                                                     
 165.  See infra notes 165–75 and accompanying text (discussing the total 
exclusion of base-rate focused risk assessments). 
 166. See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (discussing the 
redefinition of the future dangerousness aggravating factor).  
 167. See infra notes 180–93 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s 
radical departure from other jurisdictions). 
 168. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 883 (Va. 2013) (“To be 
admissible as evidence rebutting the future dangerousness aggravating factor 
under the statutes, expert opinion testimony must not narrowly assess the 
defendant’s continuing threat to prison society alone. The court therefore did not 
abuse its discretion by excluding Dr. Cunningham’s testimony as rebuttal 
evidence on the future dangerousness.”); id. at 885 (“[The evidence] sheds no 
light on [Lawlor’s] character, why he committed his past crimes and the crime 
for which he stood convicted, or how would it influence or affect his behavior 
while incarcerated. It therefore is not personalized for the purposes of 
establishing future adaptability.”).  
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defendant’s character, background, and offense only because Dr. 
Cunningham proposed to connect his assessment to the 
defendant’s known future environment—prison.169 While the 
court did not state it explicitly, its holding in Lawlor essentially 
prohibits all valid prison violence risk assessments from entering 
into the future dangerousness equation. This is because a well-
founded risk assessment for a capital defendant cannot be done 
without prison data.170 No scientifically defensible risk 
assessment will exclude the setting in which risk is to be assessed 
or the base rates of violence in that setting.171 This is especially 
true for a capital sentencing risk assessment, as it is extremely 
relevant “to consider that prison is a highly structured and 
intensively supervised setting quite distinct from free society, 
warranting utilization of base rates that are specific to that 
                                                                                                     
 169. See id. at 883 (“[E]vidence concerning a defendant’s probability of 
committing future violent acts, limited to the penal environment, is not relevant 
to consideration of the future dangerousness aggravating factor set forth in 
[Virginia’s death penalty statute].”); id. at 884 
We stress that characteristics alone are not character. Merely 
extracting a set of objective attributes about the defendant and 
inserting them into a statistical model created by compiling 
comparable attributes from others, to attempt to predict the 
probability of the defendant’s future behavior based on others’ past 
behavior does not fulfill the requirement that evidence be “peculiar to 
the defendant’s character, history, and background” under Morva. 
 170. See supra notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing defense 
experts’ risk assessment method); see also Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 
553, 572 (Va. 2009) (Koontz, J., dissenting) 
By holding that this evidence regarding “context” is inadmissible, the 
majority effectively excludes all future prison risk assessment 
evidence and establishes a per se rule of inadmissibility because, as 
Dr. Cunningham stated, the conditions of confinement are a 
necessary component of such an assessment. The majority fails to 
recognize that when calculating the risk of future violent acts, “prison 
life” evidence is relevant and essential to achieving an individualized 
prediction. 
 171. See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 75 (“‘It is clear that in 
order to adequately predict individual aggressive behavior, one must know 
something about the environment in which the individual is functioning.’” 
(citations omitted)); Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 71 (“As a 
growing body of data reflects, the serious prison violence of concern to capital 
risk assessments has a very low base rate. These low base rates provide a 
critically important foundation for reliable risk assessments for prison, not an 
impediment to them.”).  
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context.”172 Consequently, a risk assessment for a capital 
defendant that omits the relevant prison violence base rate from 
the evaluation will be fundamentally speculative and 
inaccurate.173  
Thus, the holding in Lawlor ensures that base rate-focused 
risk assessments will never be admitted. Base rates represent 
data from the general prison environment, and Lawlor makes 
clear that such general prison evidence will never be 
admissible.174 It is ironic that the court considers a base rate—
which, as previously discussed, is considered the most critical 
component of a reliable risk assessment175—as “speculation.”176 
This is because the only alternative to base rate-focused risk 
assessments is precisely that: jury speculation.177 Without 
evidence grounded in scientifically sound predictions, jurors will 
rely on conjecture, intuition, personal biases, and misinformation 
to assess the defendant’s likelihood of future violent acts.178 
Nonetheless, the court’s decision effectively prohibits capital 
                                                                                                     
 172. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 75. 
 173. See Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 71 (“‘[T]he most 
common significant error made by clinicians in the prediction of violent behavior 
relates to ignorance of information surrounding the statistical base rate of 
violence in the population in question.’” (citations omitted)); Cunningham, supra 
note 51, at 836 (“Broadly conceptualized, accuracy in probability estimates 
requires statistical data specifying the rate of violence in a similarly situated 
group or in the face of a particular characteristic. Inaccuracy occurs when such 
data are unavailable or when the available data are ignored.”). See also supra 
notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing base rates).  
 174. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 883 (Va. 2013) (“The 
statute does not limit this consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is 
ineligible for parole, and we decline [the defendant’s] effective request that we 
rewrite the statute to restrict its scope.” (quoting Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 
S.E.2d 866, 879 (Va. 2000))); id. at 884 (“Merely stating that the percentage of 
violent crimes committed by a specified demographic group [in the prison 
environment] sharing one of the defendant’s attributes is lower, based on 
statistical models, than others who do not share it does not suffice.”).  
 175. See supra notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of base rates to a valid risk assessment).  
 176. Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 
S.E.2d 415, 442 (Va. 2008)).  
 177. See supra notes 39–57 and accompanying text (discussing speculation 
in future dangerousness predictions when base rates are not incorporated into 
the equation).  
 178. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1254 (“[J]urors’ assessments 
of future dangerousness is highly subjective.”). 
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defendants from presenting as part of their defense a 
scientifically reliable risk assessment, a decision that has 
significant consequences for the meaning of the future 
dangerousness aggravating factor in Virginia.  
2. Virginia’s Future Dangerousness Aggravating Factor No 
Longer Requires Juries to Perform Forward-Looking Risk 
Assessments  
The Lawlor court justified its exclusion of prison violence risk 
assessments on the grounds that Virginia’s death penalty statute 
decrees what evidence is relevant to the future dangerousness 
inquiry.179  “The relevant evidence is ‘the past criminal record of 
convictions of the defendant,’ . . . and ‘evidence of the prior 
history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offense of which he is accused.’”180 The court 
made clear that, under Virginia’s death penalty statute, context 
is not relevant to a future dangerousness assessment in any way. 
The court also reiterated its holding from prior decisions that “the 
question of future dangerousness is about the defendant’s 
volition, not his opportunity, to commit acts of violence.”181 
It follows that in order to satisfy Virginia’s future 
dangerousness aggravating factor, the jury must not engage in a 
forward-looking risk assessment to determine whether the 
defendant is actually likely to commit future acts of violence. 
Instead, the court’s requirement that the jury assess whether the 
defendant has the “mental inclination” to commit violence—based 
on statutorily defined, backwards-looking evidence—effectively 
requires the jury to engage in a subjective character assessment 
of the defendant.182 The jury must determine whether the 
                                                                                                     
 179. See Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 881 (“The statutes . . . define the evidence 
relevant to prove the future dangerousness aggravating factor, or the 
probability that the defendant ‘would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.’”). 
 180. Id. (citations omitted).  
 181. Id. at 882. See also Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 565 
(2009) (“Our precedent is clear that a court should exclude evidence concerning 
the defendant’s diminished opportunities to commit criminal acts of violence in 
the future due to the security conditions in the prison.”).  
 182. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (Va. 2013) (“[T]he 
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defendant possesses certain characteristics, based on his 
background, character, and record, that tend to show he is a 
person of violent character. In other words, the jury must make a 
finding as to whether or not the capital offense he committed was 
“in character.” This redefinition of the future dangerousness 
statutory aggravating factor departs drastically from all other 
jurisdictions’ interpretation of future dangerousness, and it is 
certainly not what the Supreme Court intended “future 
dangerousness” to mean when it decided Jurek v. Texas. 
3. Virginia’s Redefinition Diverges From Every Other Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition is in conflict 
with every other jurisdiction that has similar “future 
dangerousness” sentencing factors in its death penalty statutory 
schemes. This divergence is most obviously discerned by a 
comparison with the architect of the “future dangerousness” 
statute, Texas.183 Recognizing that the terms in the death penalty 
statute relating to future dangerousness should be interpreted 
according to their “ordinary meaning,”184 Texas courts 
understand that a future dangerousness assessment means that 
“the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there is a probability that [the defendant] would commit 
criminal acts of violence in the future, so as to constitute a 
continuing threat, whether in or out of prison.”185  Accordingly, 
Texas courts consistently permit capital defendants to present 
risk-assessment evidence that takes into account general prison 
conditions.186  
                                                                                                     
issue is not whether the defendant is physically capable of committing violence, 
but whether he has the mental inclination to do so.”); see also id. at 883 (“[T]he 
relevant inquiry is narrowly focused on whether the particular defendant is 
inclined to commit violence in prison, not whether prison security or conditions 
of confinement render him incapable of committing such violence. Unlike 
inclination or volition, capacity—i.e., what a prisoner could do—is not relevant 
to character.”).  
 183. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing Texas as the first 
state to use future dangerousness in its sentencing scheme).  
 184. King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).  
 185. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 506–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  
 186. See, e.g., Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 852–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1991) (finding reversible error to exclude actuarial testimony by risk-assessment 
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Oregon also interprets its future dangerousness statutory 
language “as those words are commonly understood.”187 Because a 
future dangerousness inquiry necessarily involves a forward-
looking assessment, Oregon courts allow capital defendants to 
introduce risk assessments that take into account their future 
environment.188 Thus, capital defendants in Oregon are generally 
allowed to present risk assessment evidence that incorporates 
general prison conditions, including prison security measures.189 
And Oklahoma courts, like Oregon and Texas courts, define 
future dangerousness according to the “common sense” meaning 
of the term.190 Oklahoma’s future dangerousness statutory 
aggravating factor is “phrased in conventional and 
understandable terms, . . . and presents the sentencer with the 
type of forward-looking inquiry that is a permissible part of the 
                                                                                                     
expert). The Matson court rejected the State’s argument that the expert’s 
testimony was inadmissible because “the witness based his opinion on 
experience in the criminal justice system and probability estimates ‘in general’ 
rather than on individuals with characteristics and backgrounds similar to 
those of appellant,” because denying the defendant the opportunity to present 
this evidence “would be tantamount to preventing appellant from presenting his 
own side of the case.” Id. at 852–53. See also Anderson v. Quarterman, 204 Fed. 
App’x 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that at trial, defense counsel presented 
testimony from a psychologist, who testified that “testing had confirmed that 
Anderson was dangerous but that he believed that the security in the Texas 
prison system would be able to prevent Anderson from committing violent acts 
in prison”); Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) 
(noting that the trial court allowed the defendant to call the prison warden to 
testify “about the prison classification system and controls in place to maintain 
security and safety within the prison system”). 
 187. State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904, 914 (Or. 1993).  
 188. See State v. Douglas, 800 P.2d 288, 296 (Or. 1990) (“When the jury 
considers the threat that the defendant might pose because of future violent 
crimes, it may consider the threat to prison society.”).  
 189. See, e.g., id. at 296 
The evidence in a particular case could make an instruction on the 
possibility of release relevant to the jury’s assessment of future 
dangerousness. For example, an expert might testify that the 
defendant would not pose a threat to prison society, because of its 
structured environment, but would pose a threat to society at large, if 
released. 
 190. See Sanchez v. State, 223 P.3d 980, 1007 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) 
(noting that the future dangerousness aggravating factor “is not 
unconstitutional if it has some common sense core of meaning . . . that criminal 
juries should be capable of understanding” (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
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sentencing process.”191 Because a future dangerousness 
assessment necessarily involves a forward-looking evaluation, 
Oklahoma courts allow defendants to proffer base rate-focused 
risk assessment evidence.192 Likewise, Idaho courts interpret its 
future dangerousness statutory language as requiring a forward-
looking assessment of the defendant’s probability to commit 
dangerous acts in the future but have not yet evaluated the 
admissibility of base rate-focused risk assessment evidence.193 
The jurisdictions discussed in this section all follow the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of what it means for the jury to 
make a “future dangerousness” assessment.194 That is to say, a 
future dangerousness inquiry involves a capital jury “predict[ing] 
future behavior.”195 The Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition 
of the future dangerousness aggravating factor from a forward-
looking risk assessment to a character-based risk assessment 
diverges from this commonsense interpretation, and Virginia’s 
future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor can no longer 
                                                                                                     
 191. Id. at 1008 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 192. See Rojem v. State, 207 P.3d 385, 390–91 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) 
(discussing Dr. Cunningham’s testimony at sentencing, for which “Cunningham 
created a developmental profile for [the defendant] explaining the formative 
basis for his decision-making, as well as a risk assessment profile to determine 
his potential for future dangerousness in prison”); Hanson v. State, 72 P.3d 40, 
51–53 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003)  
This Court has never held inadmissible evidence of a defendant’s 
propensity for future violence, in or out of prison, to support 
continuing threat. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have 
explicitly held that psychiatric evidence is relevant on this issue. Its 
scientific reliability has long been accepted. This Court has not held 
that the specific “risk assessment” evidence of future dangerousness, 
combining clinical results with a defendant’s own history, is 
inadmissible. Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme 
Court have suggested that this evidence would be irrelevant on the 
issue of future dangerousness. 
 193. See State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 472 (1983) (citing Jurek v. Texas and 
discussing future dangerousness as requiring a prediction of future behavior). 
Additionally, after extensive research it appears that Wyoming courts have 
neither interpreted the meaning of its future dangerousness statutory 
aggravating factor nor evaluated the admissibility of base rate-focused risk 
assessment evidence. 
 194. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of future dangerousness).  
 195. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976). 
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be justified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jurek.196 
Consequently, a reexamination of Virginia’s future 
dangerousness statutory aggravating factor is needed. As 
evidenced below, Virginia’s future dangerousness aggravating 
factor, as the Virginia Supreme Court now interprets it, no longer 
survives constitutional scrutiny.  
B. The Troubling Implications of Lawlor 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition of the statutory 
aggravating factor from a forward-looking risk assessment to a 
subjective character assessment is troubling because of its 
constitutional implications. The redefinition of the aggravating 
factor produces significant Eighth Amendment issues in light of 
the provision’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 
This section discusses the constitutional concerns that are raised 
by the Virginia court’s interpretation of future dangerousness in 
Lawlor. 
1. The Redefined Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
Prohibition Against the Arbitrary Implementation of the 
Death Penalty 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits 
capital punishment sentencing procedures that create a 
substantial risk of arbitrary and capricious imposition.197 In 
essence, “capital punishment [must] be imposed fairly, and with 
reasonable consistency, or not at all.”198 To ensure consistent and 
fair application of the death penalty, an aggravating 
                                                                                                     
 196. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (Va. 1978) (upholding 
Virginia’s future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor based principally 
on the Supreme Court’s approval of the aggravating factor in Jurek). 
 197. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“The high service rendered by the ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment 
clause . . . is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded, 
nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general 
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.”).  
 198. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).  
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circumstance must meet two specific constitutional requirements: 
it cannot apply to every convicted murderer and it cannot be 
unconstitutionally vague, in the sense that the language of the 
aggravating circumstance itself fails to provide “any guidance to 
the sentencer.”199 
Virginia’s future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor 
is not necessarily unconstitutional on its face.200 Rather, it is the 
Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition that runs afoul of the 
Constitution. As discussed above, the court’s redefinition asks the 
jury to conduct a character-based assessment of the capital 
defendant to determine whether it is likely, given the defendant’s 
disposition, that he would commit violent acts in the future. 
Because the court limits the jury’s assessment only to evidence of 
the capital defendant’s prior history and offense, effectively every 
risk assessment could conclude that the defendant would pose a 
future danger to society. All capital defendants have committed 
heinous crimes.  When considering evidence of background, 
character, record, and the prosecution’s subjective “expert” 
testimony, it would seem that every capital defendant possesses 
characteristics tending to show that he is a person of violent 
character.201 Thus, the court’s interpretation of Virginia’s death 
penalty statute does not pass constitutional muster because the 
sentencing factor could reasonably apply to every convicted 
murderer.202  
This leads to the standardless sentencing discretion that the 
Court has deemed intolerable under the Constitution. The 
redefined aggravating factor does not “channel the jury’s 
discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific 
and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the 
                                                                                                     
 199. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993). 
 200. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing Jurek v. 
Texas and the Supreme Court’s approval of the future dangerousness 
aggravating factor).  
 201. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 834 (“[U]nder what circumstances 
would a recently convicted . . . capital offender not be considered dangerous, 
compared with a law-abiding member of the community?”). 
 202. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980) (striking down as 
unconstitutional one of Georgia’s statutory aggravating factors because “[a] 
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as 
‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman’”). 
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process for imposing a sentence of death.”203 It now irrationally 
departs from the commonsense understanding that the 
aggravating factor directs the jury to undertake a predictive 
inquiry about the defendant’s likelihood to commit additional 
violent crimes if allowed to live204 and instructs the jury to 
perform some arbitrary assessment of the defendant’s character. 
Absent further guidance, a juror of ordinary sensibility could 
reasonably characterize any capital defendant to be a person of 
dangerous character. This “standardless and unchanneled 
imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a 
basically uninstructed jury” violates the Eighth Amendment.205 
2. The Redefined Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
Mandate that the Defendant Has the Right to Present All 
Mitigating Evidence 
Not only does the redefined future dangerousness 
aggravating factor violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against the arbitrary implementation of the death penalty, it also 
violates the defendant’s right to present all relevant mitigating 
evidence. The Supreme Court held in Lockett v. Ohio206 that, 
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, the jury must “not be 
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of 
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 
less than death.”207 The Court later stated that “evidence that the 
defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) 
must be considered potentially mitigating.”208 “[A] defendant’s 
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to 
                                                                                                     
 203. Id. at 427 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 204. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (stating that in conducting 
a future dangerousness analysis, the jury is instructed to “predict future 
behavior”). 
 205. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429.  
 206. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 207. Id. at 604.  
 208. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986); see also id. at 7 n.2 
(“Such evidence of adjustability to life in prison unquestionably goes to a feature 
of the defendant’s character that is highly relevant to a jury’s sentencing 
determination.”).  
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life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its 
nature relevant to the sentencing determination.”209 The 
Supreme Court of Virginia’s preclusion of base rate-focused risk 
assessment evidence, which specifically takes into account a 
defendant’s ability to adapt to prison life, violates these 
fundamental constitutional standards. 
Individualized risk assessments, like the one that the 
defendant proffered in Lawlor, are based on characteristics such 
as the defendant’s age, employment history, and ongoing 
connections with family and friends.210 Such evidence, which 
serves the “explicit purpose of convincing the jury that [the 
defendant] should be spared the death penalty because he would 
pose no undue danger to his jailers or fellow prisoners and could 
lead a useful life behind bars if sentenced to life imprisonment,” 
is powerful mitigation evidence because it tends to make jurors 
less likely to impose death. 211 It demonstrates to the jury that a 
life sentence, rather than a death sentence, is appropriate. Risk 
assessment evidence demonstrating that the defendant would 
pose a low risk of violence in the prison environment is exactly 
what the Court has held cannot constitutionally be excluded as 
mitigating evidence. 
The preceding discussion argues that the Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s redefinition of the Commonwealth’s future 
dangerousness aggravating factor runs afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment. The court’s reinterpretation of the aggravating 
factor cannot stand in light of the Constitution’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment. The argument may be made, however, that 
Lawlor did not in fact redefine the aggravating factor. Although it 
is difficult to defend this argument,212 the next section addresses 
the constitutional deficiencies in Virginia’s future dangerousness 
statutory aggravating factor if the court’s decision in Lawlor is 
interpreted in this alternative manner. 
                                                                                                     
 209. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  
 210. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 48 (“Dr. 
Cunningham’s opinions . . . did not constitute evidence of what a person may 
expect in the penal system[,] . . . but concern[ed] the history or experience of the 
defendant, . . . reflecting Mr. Lawlor’s specific characteristics . . . .”).  
 211. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7.  
 212. See supra notes 168–79 and accompanying text (discussing Lawlor’s 
impact on Virginia’s future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor).  
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C. An Alternative Reading of Lawlor 
Notwithstanding the foregoing argument that Lawlor 
effectively redefines Virginia’s statutory aggravating factor to 
require the jury to perform a character assessment rather than a 
risk assessment, one might assert that the court’s decision does 
not inevitably redefine the aggravating circumstance to require a 
character assessment. If Lawlor is read to require Virginia juries 
to make a forward-looking assessment to predict a capital 
defendant’s likely future behavior, the aggravating factor is 
nevertheless unconstitutional. This is because the capital 
defendant’s constitutional right to rebut the Commonwealth’s 
future dangerousness claim is unquestionably violated. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s capital decisions have long 
presumed that claims of future dangerousness will be subjected 
to thorough adversarial testing.213 This is because the Due 
Process Clause requires that the defendant be allowed to rebut 
all accusations by the prosecution.214 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia’s holding in Lawlor runs afoul of this constitutional 
mandate by prohibiting a vital tool in the defense’s rebuttal 
argument, and for all practical purposes, it renders the 
prosecution’s claim of future dangerousness a nearly 
unrebuttable assertion.  
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of the “future 
dangerousness” statutory aggravating factor denies the Virginia 
capital defendant the constitutionally required opportunity to 
“present his own side of the case.”215 The capital defendant is 
prohibited from presenting the strongest argument concerning 
why he is unlikely to commit serious violent acts in the future—
namely, the commonsense understanding that “preventative 
                                                                                                     
 213. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (“We are 
unconvinced . . . that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the 
reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, 
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own 
side of the case.”). 
 214. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (“Where the 
prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking 
for the death penalty, . . . elemental due process require[s] that a defendant not 
be sentenced to death ‘on the basis of information which he had no opportunity 
to deny or explain.’” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977))). 
 215. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.  
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measures such as lock down, isolation, and shackled movement 
reduce and counter the opportunity for violence toward others.”216 
A capital defendant is left to present only backwards-looking 
evidence. Because the defendant is a convicted capital murderer, 
who undoubtedly committed a gruesome crime, there is no 
reasonable way he can effectively argue that he will not pose a 
danger to society in the future with such a limited range of 
evidence. In essence, the defendant is “not permitted the means 
to effectively respond to the Commonwealth’s assertions” that he 
would likely commit violent acts in the future if allowed to live 
out his life in prison.217 If Lawlor is read to require a forward-
looking assessment, it is clear that Virginia law now bases a 
death penalty sentence on unsubstantiated speculation about the 
defendant’s likely behavior in society,218 after an imaginary 
release from prison which is legally certain never to happen,219 
while prohibiting the defendant from presenting his strongest 
rebuttal argument. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s exclusion of base rate-
focused evidence is in tension with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, which involved the due 
process right to rebut the prosecution’s claims of future 
dangerousness.220 The Court in Simmons held that capital 
defendants have a due process right to rebut prosecution claims 
of future dangerousness by informing juries that their “life 
imprisonment” sentencing option carries with it no chance of 
parole.221 This “life without parole” evidence has nothing to do 
                                                                                                     
 216. Tanner, supra note 38, at 385. 
 217. Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 569 (Va. 2009) (Koontz, J., 
dissenting). 
 218. See supra notes 59–74 and accompanying text (discussing the counter-
intuitive reality that the actual rate of serious violence by imprisoned 
murderers is far lower than the “continuing threat” predictions of misinformed 
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 219. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (discussing abolition of 
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 220. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 (1994) (“Like the 
defendants in Skipper and Gardner, petitioner was prevented from rebutting 
information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon which it may 
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 221. See id. at 171 (“The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing 
generalized arguments regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness while, 
at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never 
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with a defendant’s past record, history, or offense, and yet the 
Supreme Court determined that it was appropriate and critical 
evidence to rebut the prosecution’s future dangerousness claim.222  
The Simmons decision demonstrates that, despite what the 
Supreme Court of Virginia has mistakenly held, merely because 
evidence is generally applicable to all inmates does not 
automatically disqualify it from consideration as rebuttal 
evidence. Because the relevant inquiry is constitutional in nature 
rather than statutory, evidence that does not necessarily pertain 
to a defendant’s past record, history, or offense may nonetheless 
be constitutionally required. Risk assessment evidence is 
precisely that type of constitutionally mandated evidence.   
Accordingly, even if the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision 
in Lawlor requires a forward-looking risk assessment in 
determining a capital defendant’s future dangerousness, the 
aggravating circumstance cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Either way it is interpreted, it is undoubtedly time for a 
critical reassessment of the Commonwealth’s understanding of 
“future dangerousness.” 
VI. Conclusion 
Death is different.223 Because of its finality, any death 
penalty scheme deserves increased precautions to ensure that it 
is not imposed speciously. Despite this reality, Virginia law 
places a defendant’s future dangerousness at the center of its 
capital sentencing process but does little to guarantee its fair 
implementation. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s latest decision 
                                                                                                     
will be released on parole.”).  
 222. See id. at 165 (“The logic and effectiveness of [the defendant’s] 
argument naturally depended on the fact that he was legally ineligible for 
parole and thus would remain in prison if afforded a life sentence.”).  
 223. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)  
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from 
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of 
only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific 
case. 
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in Lawlor solidifies once and for all the fundamental unfairness 
of the Commonwealth’s capital sentencing scheme. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s long and convoluted course 
to its current interpretation of Virginia’s future dangerousness 
statutory aggravating factor has ended in a construal of the 
aggravating factor that runs afoul of essential constitutional 
standards. A future dangerousness inquiry under Virginia’s 
capital sentencing scheme now requires a jury to base its future 
dangerousness assessment not on a prediction of a defendant’s 
likely future behavior but instead on some amorphous facet of the 
defendant’s character.224 By banning modern risk assessment 
methodology in Virginia capital proceedings and allowing 
unscientific and unreliable evidence in its stead, capital juries are 
left to make unfettered determinations as to which capital 
defendants live and which capital defendants die. Such 
unrestrained infliction of the death penalty is a clear violation of 
the Supreme Court’s long-established rule that a sentence of 
death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that 
create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner.225  
Virginia’s steadfast fixation with the death penalty has led it 
to issue its most far-reaching decision to date. Not only does 
Lawlor go well beyond any other jurisdiction,226 it offends 
constitutional standards on multiple fronts. Critical changes are 
needed to the Commonwealth’s capital sentencing structure. A 
future dangerousness inquiry should not involve a nebulous 
evaluation of the capital defendant’s character—it should entail a 
prediction into the defendant’s likely future behavior based on 
empirical, reliable risk assessment evidence. The Virginia 
sentencing process should allow capital defendants to provide a 
jury with an accurate understanding of life without parole and 
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should not leave jurors to speculate about possibilities. Unless 
Virginia corrects its interpretation of its future dangerousness 
statutory aggravating factor, the current capital sentencing 
scheme runs too great a risk that the death penalty will be 
applied “sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular 
groups.”227 
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